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The image displayed above is a work by Richard Purcell, entitled The Honorable Sir William Howe from 1777 (Anne S. K. Brown Military History Collection, Brown University Library), which shows His Lordship wearing the Order of the Bath awarded for his victory at the battle of Long Island (otherwise known as the battle of Brooklyn) on August 27, 1776. Although he was clearly an able and personally courageous officer, Howe exhibited an unimaginative and cautious leadership style as commander of the British army in America from 1775 to 1778. He failed to deliver a knockout blow against the rebel army in 1776 and allowed Washington an opportunity to strike at the Hessian contingent in Trenton, the most vulnerable in a chain of overextended outposts in which Howe deployed his troops for the winter of 1776-77. Sir William would be subjected to intense criticism that led him to call for a parliamentary committee of inquiry so as to vindicate his conduct in America, but the committee adjourned without reaching a conclusion.

The cautious tactics pursued by Howe may have very well stemmed, at least in part, from his experience at the battle of Bunker Hill or (actually) Breed’s Hill on June 17, 1775—250 years ago next week. And that, in turn, may have significantly impacted whatever hopes the British had of scoring a quick knockout blow against the Revolutionary enterprise in 1776, which was arguably their best chance to win the war.

The preservation of his army against what Howe perceived as an unnecessary hazard seems to have been paramount in his thinking and that logic was based, at least in part, on very painful personal experience. This was perhaps the psychological residue of his having been present at the bloodbath sustained by the crown’s soldiers at Breed’s Hill, for we know that Howe was horrified by what he saw there. His side carried the field but suffered more than a thousand casualties—some 40 percent of the British force—and all 12 of his aides were shot around him, only one of whom survived. In his understandably despondent reflection on “this unhappy day,” a distressed Howe wrote, “when I look to the consequences of it, in the loss of so many brave officers, I do it with horror. The success is too dearly bought.” He later explained his failure to launch a frontal assault on the American fortifications at Brooklyn Heights immediately following the battle at Long Island by asserting the logic of a more risk-averse plan of action: a siege that would accomplish the same purpose but with far fewer casualties. As he put it, “the lines must have been ours at a cheap rate by regular approaches.” Whatever his motivation, this go-slow approach gave the Patriot troops the opportunity they desperately needed to evacuate Brooklyn Heights two nights after the battle and escape across the East River to the safety (albeit temporary) of Manhattan Island.

Whether because of his memory of Breed’s Hill or a desire to defeat the rebels with as little bloodshed as possible so as to bring about a relatively harmonious reconciliation between the two sides, Howe, throughout the New York campaign, eschewed the kind of scorched-earth policy—a concerted effort to destroy Washington’s army and lay waste to the Manhattan and Westchester countryside—that may have been required to crush the rebellion. And by doing so, he passed up an opportunity to shatter the confidence of the insurgents and thereby undermine their resolution to continue resisting the invaders. With the notable exception of the battle of White Plains on October 28, 1776, Howe continued his policy of avoiding frontal assaults and instead relying on flanking movements against the Americans, as he had done at Long Island and would repeat at the battle of Brandywine Creek on September 11, 1777. On both occasions, he achieved a tactical victory but failed in his objective of crushing Washington’s force. These were probably the two biggest engagements of the war in terms of the number of troops involved, and in both cases Howe’s foe eluded the Briton’s desire for a victory that would eliminate the opposing army as an effective fighting force and thereby quash the rebellion. In short, his failure presaged Britain’s ultimate debacle in this struggle. And Howe.

The content of this post is, in part, adapted from my new book, Winning the Ten Crucial Days.

And speaking of which, here’s the latest review to come in:

“David Price joins the ranks of recent scholars contributing to the study of the battles of Trenton and Princeton. In examining the keys to Washington’s winter victories, Price goes beyond a standard campaign narrative. His focus is instead thematic, exploring how five factors— leadership, geography, weather, artillery, and contingency—all influenced the campaign. This new approach is well worth the read.”
—JOHN R. MAASS, Ph.D., historian with the National Museum of the United States Army and author of From Trenton to Yorktown: Turning Points of the Revolutionary War

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You may have never heard of Discover Magazine magazine, and neither had I until very recently; however, this article made its way into the spring issue and I thought you might enjoy it. (My marching orders were to limit this to two pages, but hopefully brevity is not its only virtue.)

This piece actually ensued from something I wrote for the Journal of the American Revolution (JAR) in response to a question posed to contributors by the editors: What is the most underrated event that occurred in 1775, and why should it get more attention? My response apparently piqued the interest of the magazine’s co-publisher and co-founder, Cynthia Baudendistel—so my thanks to JAR.

And BTW, you can check out the magazine’s Battle Road Official Commemorative book, Discover the Battle Road, here.

For anyone who may have been thinking about purchasing my newest hardcover creation, here are the latest reviews to come in:

“I found Winning the Ten Crucial Days to be a fascinating and insightful new look at this critical period of history. The idea of leadership involving theatrical gestures is spot on. David Price’s treatment of Washington is fair and balanced with enlightening nuance—as with Joseph Reed and Edward Hand, both so important to this story, and John Cadwalader and Henry Knox. Price’s emphasis on the complexity of all the factors is well taken, luck included. It brought to mind the old dictum, ‘Armchair generals talk about battles, real generals talk about logistics.’ Things like geography, weather, supplies, etc. often make the difference.”
— JACK KELLY, author of God Save Benedict Arnold, Band of Giants, and other books on the Revolutionary War and early America  

And from the other side of the pond  .  .  .

“This book offers an interesting approach to analysing Washington’s winter campaign that will best be appreciated by readers who already have some familiarity with the battles from more conventional military histories.… Contains much useful information and is well worth reading.”
— MINIATURE WARGAMES magazine, published in Great Britain since 1983

And speaking of the other side of the pond  .  .  .

At the initiative of Aaron Callan, Editor of The Bann Disc (since 1994 the annually published journal of the Coleraine Historical Society in Northern Ireland), I’ve conjured up a draft of an article about John Haslet and the Delaware Continental Regiment of 1776 for a special edition of that periodical. (Haslet grew up in the area.) This edition, to be released next year, will commemorate the 250th anniversary of American independence and the historical connection between Ulster and the American Revolution. (BTW, the Bann disc is an Iron Age bronze artifact discovered in the River Bann near Coleraine in 1939. Irish I could think of something clever to say about that—but obviously cannot. On the other hand, if the article was very long—which it’s not—you could say it has a lot of Bann width.)

Finally, for anyone interested in buying commemorative American Revolution stamps from the USPS, you’ll find more information about that here.

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Well, it’s almost here—the 250th anniversary of the date that armed combat erupted in a significant way between British troops occupying Boston and the provincial militia, which triggered the longest war in American history prior to Vietnam. At that time, both sides probably shared the same expectant assumption that hostilities were unavoidable in the absence of any change in the mother country’s colonial policy or the attitude of Whig-minded insurrectionists among the body politic—and now, at last, the powder keg had exploded at Lexington and Concord. The wait was over.

In his diary, Frederick MacKenzie, the son of a Dublin merchant who arrived in Boston in 1774 as a lieutenant in the British army (and would be promoted to captain in the fall of 1775), recorded his firsthand observations about the events and dismal outcome of the ill-fated and bloody expedition by his redcoated countrymen, as ordered by General Thomas Gage, into the Massachusetts countryside on April 19, 1775 to secure military supplies gathered by the insurgents. Here are some excerpts from the lieutenant’s entries in the immediate aftermath of the opening clash:

April 19—During the whole of the march from Lexington [as the British withdrew to Boston after they had exchanged shots with the militia at Lexington and Concord], the rebels kept an incessant irregular fire from all points at the column, which was the more galling as our flanking parties, which at first were placed at sufficient distances to cover the march of it, were at last, from the different obstructions they occasionally met with, obliged to keep almost close to it. Our men had very few opportunities of getting good shots at the rebels, as they hardly ever fired but under cover of a stone wall, from behind a tree, or out of a house; and the moment they had fired, they lay down out of sight until they had loaded again or the column had passed…. Many houses were plundered by the soldiers, notwithstanding the efforts of the officers to prevent it. I have no doubt this inflamed the rebels, and made many of them follow us farther than they would otherwise have done.

April 20—It is conceived by many that the expedition to Concord for the destruction of the military stores, which it is said were deposited there in considerable quantities, might have been conducted with greater secrecy, and been effected without the loss which ensued and the consequences which must now inevitably follow….

There was a general muster of all the neighboring militia only the day before (whether by accident, or in consequence of the general’s intention is not certain, but most probably the latter) so that every man was in a state of preparation and equipment. This should have been known, because if their meeting was not on purpose to oppose the troops, there was hardly time for them to disperse and return to their several homes. I believe the fact is that General Gage was not only much deceived with respect to the quantity of military stores said to be collected at Concord but had no conception the rebels would have opposed the king’s troops in the manner they did. But the temper of the people, the preparations they had been making all the winter to oppose the troops should they move out of Boston with hostile intentions, and above all their declared resolution to do so made it evident to most persons that opposition would be made on any attempt to destroy stores and ammunition which they had avowedly collected for the defense of the province….

The troops [are] ordered to lay dressed in their barracks this night.

April 21—The town is now surrounded by armed rebels, who have intercepted all communication with the country.

This was the beginning of the American siege of Boston that would last almost a year and end only when His Majesty’s forces evacuated the city on March 17, 1776—never to return.

On another April 19—exactly eight years later—the pamphleteer Thomas Paine, author of America’s first bestselling publication Common Sense, released the last of his Crisis series, wherein he ruminated about the outcome of the American rebellion. He termed it “a revolution, which to the end of time, must be an honor to the age that accomplished it, and which has contributed more to enlighten the world, and diffuse a spirit of freedom and liberality among mankind, than any human event (if this may be called one) that ever preceded it.”

Sources:

“Frederick MacKenzie: Diary, April 18-21, 1775,” in The American Revolution: Writings from the War of Independence, ed. John Rhodehamel (The Library of America, 2001), 5-18.

Thomas Paine, “The Last Crisis, Number XVIII,” April 19, 1783, in Thomas Paine, Collected Writings, ed. Eric Foner (The Library of America, 1955), 348-354.