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The image displayed above is a work by Richard Purcell, entitled The Honorable Sir William Howe from 1777 (Anne S. K. Brown Military History Collection, Brown University Library), which shows His Lordship wearing the Order of the Bath awarded for his victory at the battle of Long Island (otherwise known as the battle of Brooklyn) on August 27, 1776. Although he was clearly an able and personally courageous officer, Howe exhibited an unimaginative and cautious leadership style as commander of the British army in America from 1775 to 1778. He failed to deliver a knockout blow against the rebel army in 1776 and allowed Washington an opportunity to strike at the Hessian contingent in Trenton, the most vulnerable in a chain of overextended outposts in which Howe deployed his troops for the winter of 1776-77. Sir William would be subjected to intense criticism that led him to call for a parliamentary committee of inquiry so as to vindicate his conduct in America, but the committee adjourned without reaching a conclusion.
The cautious tactics pursued by Howe may have very well stemmed, at least in part, from his experience at the battle of Bunker Hill or (actually) Breed’s Hill on June 17, 1775—250 years ago next week. And that, in turn, may have significantly impacted whatever hopes the British had of scoring a quick knockout blow against the Revolutionary enterprise in 1776, which was arguably their best chance to win the war.
The preservation of his army against what Howe perceived as an unnecessary hazard seems to have been paramount in his thinking and that logic was based, at least in part, on very painful personal experience. This was perhaps the psychological residue of his having been present at the bloodbath sustained by the crown’s soldiers at Breed’s Hill, for we know that Howe was horrified by what he saw there. His side carried the field but suffered more than a thousand casualties—some 40 percent of the British force—and all 12 of his aides were shot around him, only one of whom survived. In his understandably despondent reflection on “this unhappy day,” a distressed Howe wrote, “when I look to the consequences of it, in the loss of so many brave officers, I do it with horror. The success is too dearly bought.” He later explained his failure to launch a frontal assault on the American fortifications at Brooklyn Heights immediately following the battle at Long Island by asserting the logic of a more risk-averse plan of action: a siege that would accomplish the same purpose but with far fewer casualties. As he put it, “the lines must have been ours at a cheap rate by regular approaches.” Whatever his motivation, this go-slow approach gave the Patriot troops the opportunity they desperately needed to evacuate Brooklyn Heights two nights after the battle and escape across the East River to the safety (albeit temporary) of Manhattan Island.
Whether because of his memory of Breed’s Hill or a desire to defeat the rebels with as little bloodshed as possible so as to bring about a relatively harmonious reconciliation between the two sides, Howe, throughout the New York campaign, eschewed the kind of scorched-earth policy—a concerted effort to destroy Washington’s army and lay waste to the Manhattan and Westchester countryside—that may have been required to crush the rebellion. And by doing so, he passed up an opportunity to shatter the confidence of the insurgents and thereby undermine their resolution to continue resisting the invaders. With the notable exception of the battle of White Plains on October 28, 1776, Howe continued his policy of avoiding frontal assaults and instead relying on flanking movements against the Americans, as he had done at Long Island and would repeat at the battle of Brandywine Creek on September 11, 1777. On both occasions, he achieved a tactical victory but failed in his objective of crushing Washington’s force. These were probably the two biggest engagements of the war in terms of the number of troops involved, and in both cases Howe’s foe eluded the Briton’s desire for a victory that would eliminate the opposing army as an effective fighting force and thereby quash the rebellion. In short, his failure presaged Britain’s ultimate debacle in this struggle. And Howe.
The content of this post is, in part, adapted from my new book, Winning the Ten Crucial Days.
And speaking of which, here’s the latest review to come in:
“David Price joins the ranks of recent scholars contributing to the study of the battles of Trenton and Princeton. In examining the keys to Washington’s winter victories, Price goes beyond a standard campaign narrative. His focus is instead thematic, exploring how five factors— leadership, geography, weather, artillery, and contingency—all influenced the campaign. This new approach is well worth the read.”
—JOHN R. MAASS, Ph.D., historian with the National Museum of the United States Army and author of From Trenton to Yorktown: Turning Points of the Revolutionary War
